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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY-LACHES-EXPIRATION OF ANALOGOUS STATE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AS GROUND FOR DisMISSAL-Plaintiff,1 a seaman on the 
S.S. Ioannis, was injured when the Ioannis and the S.S. Stony Point 
collided. By the time plaintiff filed his action, the three-year state statute 
of limitations for personal injuries caused by negligence2 had expired. The 
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that the expiration of the state statute of limitations 
caused the plaintiff's action to be barred by !aches. On appeal, held, 
vacated and remanded. Expiration of the analogous3 state statute of 
limitations does not give rise to a presumption that the plaintiff's delay 
in bringing suit prejudiced the defendant. Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 
316 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1963). 
American admiralty law has been governed by the equitable doctrine 
of laches,4 the elements of which are inexcusable delay in bringing suit 
and resultant prejudice to the defendant.5 The absence of definitive rules 
for adjudicating this issue, however, caused courts to look to state statutes 
of limitations in deciding whether the defendant was barred by laches.6 
Taking state statutes as a determinative guide, the federal courts generally 
asserted that expiration of the analogous state statute of limitations 
created a presumption that the plaintiff's delay was both inexcusable and 
prejudicial.7 Consequently, before a plaintiff was permitted to assert his 
claim, he first had to rebut the presumption of prejudice.8 In discussing 
the propriety of this approach in Gardner v. Panama R.R.9 and Czaplicki 
v. The Hoegh Silvercloud,10 the Supreme Court ruled that state statutes 
were neither immaterial nor conclusive.11 These ambiguous decisions did 
1 The term plaintiff, rather than libellant, is used because suit was brought on the 
"law side" of the court. See GILMORE &: BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 1-12 (1957). 
2 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214(5). 
3 The "analogous state statute of limitations" is the limitations statute which would 
apply if the action were not a maritime claim. 
4 Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); The Key City, 81 U.S. 
653 (1871). See generally Comment, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 210 (1960). 
5 Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 189 F.2d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1961); 
Loverich v. Warner Co., US F.2d 690, 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 577 (1941). 
6 Although state statutes were at one time applied directly, McGrath v. Panama 
R.R., 298 Fed. 303 (5th Cir. 1924), the Supreme Court has held that maritime law 
determines all substantive issues of maritime claims, Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 
317 U.S. 239 (1942). Judicial recognition of the substantive character of rules relating 
to limitations, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), thus required use of 
the doctrine of !aches. 
7 Redman v. United Fruit Co., 185 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1950); Redman v. United States, 
176 F.2d 713, 715 (2d Cir. 1949); Slepski v. Dravo Corp., 104 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Pa. 1951); 
Loraine v. Coastwise Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 336, 338 (N.D. Cal. 1949). 
8 See GILMORE &: BLACK, op. cit. supra note I, § 9-81 and citations therein. 
o 342 U.S. 29 (1951). 
10 351 U.S. 525 (1956). 
11 The Gardner and Czaplicki cases held that state statutes are not to be mechan-
ically or conclusively applied. While recognizing the relevance of the statutes, however, 
the Court did not establish workable rules for applying them. 
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little to clarify the law, and subsequent to them the lower courts again 
promulgated the presumption of prejudice doctrine.12 For example, in 
1958 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Oroz v. American 
President Lines, Ltd.,18 explicitly stated that prejudice was to be presumed 
if the statute had expired, and that no prejudice was to be presumed if it 
had not expired.14 
The return to the presumption of prejudice rule, exemplified by Oroz, 
was not expressly precluded by the Supreme Court decisions, but it did 
vitiate the apparent intent of the Court. In Gardner, the Supreme Court 
instructed the courts to look to the equities of the parties in resolving the 
issue of laches.15 Compliance with the presumption of prejudice rule, 
however, prohibits examination of the equities unless the plaintiff first 
sustains the burden of overcoming the strong presumption.16 Thus a plain-
tiff who would otherwise prevail on the basis of the equities might be 
peremptorily defeated by the presumption. 
In the principal case the court rejected the presumption of prejudice 
rule, perhaps in belated response to the actual intent of the Supreme 
Court. In doing so, however, it ignored the repugnant language of its 
former decision in Oroz. The court quoted language in Oroz which it 
interpreted as less than strict approval of the doctrine.17 The language 
cited, however, was taken out of context. Read in conjunction with the 
surrounding text, the phrase exemplifies unequivocal approval of the 
presumption of prejudice.18 The rejection by the court in the principal 
12 McMahon v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 297 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1962); Vega 
v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1961); Wilson v. Northwest Marine Iron Works, 
212 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1954); Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 208 F.2d 218 
(5th Cir. 1953); Barca v. Matson Nav. Co., 211 F. Supp. 840, 843 (E.D. La. 1962); Antolos 
v. Ministere de la Marine Marchande, 214 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Smigiel v. 
Compagnie de Transports Oceaniques, 185 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Murphy v. 
International Freighting Corp., 182 F. Supp. 636, 640 (D. Mass. 1960). 
13 259 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 908 (1959). 
H "Although !aches is the proper measure of limitation, it has been long settled 
doctrine that, in deciding whether maritime claims are barred by !aches, courts of 
admiralty will use local limitations statutes as a rule-of-thumb as to the presence or 
absence of prejudice and inexcusable delay. If the statute has run, prejudice by reason 
of inexcusable delay is presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary; if it has 
not run, the converse is inferred.'' Id. at 639. (Emphasis added.) 
lli "Though the existence of !aches is a question primarily addresssed to the dis-
cretion of the trial court, the matter should not be determined merely by a reference 
to and a mechanical application of the statute of limitations. The equities of the parties 
must be considered as well.'' Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1951). 
(Emphasis added.) 
16 On the strength of the presumption, see GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 
1, § 9-80, at 631. "[I]t may be assumed that the appellate courts will not lightly find 
that the trial court has abused its discretion in dismissing a libel." Ibid. 
17 Principal case at 66. 
18 Evidence of this may be found in the frequent citation of Oroz as authority for 
applying the presumption of prejudice. Brief for Appellee, p. 9, principal case; Doherty 
v. Federal Stevedoring Co., 198 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Scott v. United Fruit Co., 
195 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Murphy v. A/S Sobral, 187 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y 
1960); Phillips v. The Hellenic, 179 F. Supp. 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Evans v. American 
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case of the presumption rule, along with the approval of the Oroz deci-
sion, as interpreted, places Oroz on an uncertain foundation. Although 
the court did not overrule Oroz, the latter's continued vitality as legal 
authority appears highly questionable. 
In explaining the rule it adopted, the court in the principal case stated 
that the factors of inexcusable delay and prejudice to the defendant are 
not to be viewed independently.19 A weak excuse may be sufficient if there 
has been no assertion of prejudice by the defendant. Conversely, only a 
strong excuse will suffice if the defendant has shown prejudice. As a matter 
of procedure, the plaintiff must first proffer evidence as to excuse for his 
delay. If the court deems this substantial, the defendant will be required 
to come forward with evidence as to prejudice, the ultimate burden of 
persuasion, however, being the plaintiffs.20 
Under the presumption of prejudice rule, the doctrine of !aches was 
applied differently in admiralty than in other areas of the law.21 By reject-
ing the rule, the principal case has not only given full effect to the Supreme 
Court's intent, but has also made the adjudication of !aches in admiralty 
similar to that in other fields. This accords with the traditional concept 
of !aches, under which the equities of the parties, rather than hard and 
fast rules, guide the disposition of the case.22 Despite the desirability of 
the court's apparent stand against the presumption of prejudice rule, how-
ever, certain troublesome statements in the principal case suggest that it 
has not been completely abandoned. 
The court stated that expiration of the analogous state statute does not 
create a presumption of prejudice, "save in the sense that if the plaintiff 
proffers no pleading or presents no proof on the issue of !aches, the 
defendant wins."23 The court was not merely asserting the settled rule 
that failure to deny an allegation is an admission of its truth.24 If that 
were the case, the phrase "save in the sense" would not be used. The use 
of this language indicates that there may be something left of the presump-
tion of prejudice rule. Furthermore, instead of stating that the only relevant 
factors in determining the issue of !aches are delay and prejudice, the 
principal case asserted that an inference is to be drawn from the expira-
tion of the analogous period of limitations.25 The court did not elucidate 
the weight to be given this inference, and failure to clarify this important 
point would appear to leave an avenue open for rejuvenation of the pre-
Export Lines, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Baez-Geigel v. American Foreign 
S.S. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
19 Principal case at 67. 
20 Ibid. On the burden of persuasion, see McCORMICK, EvmENCE § 307 (1954). 
21 For a discussion of the effect of statutes of limitations on the issue of !aches in 
other areas, see Annot., 96 L. Ed. 37 (1952). 
22 See 30 C.J.S. Equity § 115 (1942). 
23 Principal case at 66. (Emphasis added.) 
24 See CLARK, ConE PLEADING § 91, at 580 (2d ed. 1947). 
25 Principal case at 66. 
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sumption rule under the guise of an inference. It is thus conceivable that 
the holding in the principal case may be undermined, and that the courts 
may ultimately be faced with ruling on the propriety of an inference of 
prejudice, just as they were formerly faced with the propriety of a presump-
tion of prejudice.20 
Herbert H. Brown 
20 It must be remembered, however, that the principal case involved an injured 
seaman. In recent decades, the Supreme Court has expanded both substantive and 
procedural law to favor injured seamen. "The Supreme Court has now . • • practically 
guaranteed recovery in the damage action." GILMORE Be BLACK, op. cit. supra note 1, 
§ 6-5, at 258. For an interesting discussion of this development, see id. §§ 6-1 to 6-64. 
Thus, what appears to be bold doctrinal departure in the principal case may in fact 
be nothing more than the court's recognition of this trend. As a result, future applica-
tion of the court's holding may be confined to injured seamen cases, whereas the "save 
in the sense" and "inference" language may allow the courts to continue to apply the 
presumption of prejudice doctrine sub rosa in other admiralty areas without over-
ruling the principal case. 
